















long	 evolution	 of	 Middle	 East	 politics	 over	 several	 phases.	 These	 are	 combined,	 via	 a	 neo-










the	 two	 levels	 are	 incongruent,	 rival	 social	 forces	 struggle	 over	 how	 to	 bring	 them	 into	
congruence:	in	the	core,	international	institutions,	transnational	classes,	and	a	hegemonic	state	
(the	UK	or	US)	promote	a	dominant	set	of	norms	globally;	 in	 the	periphery,	 states	may	act	as	
buffers	 against	or	 transmission	belts	of	 such	global	 economic	norms,	depending	on	 the	 social	
composition	of	their	ruling	coalitions,	itself	an	outcome	of	struggles	between	social	forces	that	
stand	 to	 gain	 or	 to	 lose	 from	 these	 norms;	 in	 MENA,	 the	 Arab	 republics	 institutionalized	
populism	 in	 their	 formative	 period,	 enabled	 by	 the	 congruence	 of	 then-existing	 global	 norms	
with	their	projects,	but	thereafter	entered	a	post-populist	phase	under	global	neoliberalism	4)	
The	post-populist	Arab	regimes	that	reneged	on	the	populist	contract	offended	people’s	sense	of	
moral	 economy	 at	 cost	 of	 their	 legitimacy;	 this	 generated	 demands	 for	 a	 restoration	 of	 the	
contract	and	sparked	rebellion	against	the	failure	of	regimes	to	do	so.		
	 The	 paper	 first	 examines	 the	 historical	 roots	 of	 the	 populist	 social	 contract	 in	 the	
region’s	moral	political	economy,	notably	 the	struggle	over	popular	rights	 in	 the	18th	and	19th	
centuries;	 it	 then	 examines	 the	 post-independence	 rise	 and	 fall	 of	 populism	 in	 the	 Arab	
republics,	showing	the	initial	congruence	of	its	rise	with	global	norms	and	how	the	globalization	




Although	 the	 populist	 social	 contract	 was	 institutionalized	 under	 the	 populist	 authoritarian	
republics	 that	 arouse	 in	 the	 Arab	world	 in	 the	 1950-60s,	 they	 did	 not	 invent	 it;	 rather,	 they	
responded	 to	 a	 widespread	 expectation	 that	 they	 address	 the	 inegalitarian	 ills	 of	 the	 post-
independence	 oligarchic	 order.	 Populism	 had	 deep	 roots	 in	 MENA’s	 pre-capitalist	 political	
culture,	 the	 traditional	 moral	 economy	 within	 which,	 as	 Burke	 (1987,	 1990)	 and	 Chalcraft	
document,	many	ordinary	people	expressed	demands	that	government	fulfil	what	they	saw	as	
its	 obligation	 to	 ensure	 a	 minimum	 of	 welfare,	 notions	 derived	 from	 custom,	 religion	 and	






entitlements	were	 seen	as	part	of	natural	 justice,	which,	when	 taken	away,	 regularly	 inspired	
protest	and	revolt	(Frerichs	2014,	611).	The	spread	of	capitalist	norms	and	practices	in	the	18th	
and	 19th	 centuries,	 such	 as	 commodification	 of	 labour	 and	 expropriation	 of	 state	 or	 common	
land	as	private	property,	collided	with	pre-capitalist	notions	of	justice,	provoking	what	Chalcraft	
(2007)	 called	 “movements	 for	 self-protection,”	 mobilized	 to	 defend	 perceived	 existing	 rights	
against	attempts	to	nullify	them	in	the	name	of	market	forces.	These	took	the	forms	of	chronic	
protest	and	everyday	forms	of	resistance,	but	also	petitioning	the	state	to	arbitrate	and	regulate	
the	 market.	 At	 this	 point,	 popular	 demands	 were	 not	 for	 redistribution	 per	 se,	 but	 for	
restoration	of	inherited	rights	being	revoked.	
	 An	 early	 episode	 of	 norm	 clash	 was	 in	 late	 Ottoman	 times	 when	 peasants,	 who	 had	
traditionally	enjoyed	usufruct	on	what	had	been	state-owned	lands	and	considerable	autonomy	
(Gerber	1987:	 9-15),	 lost	 this	with	 the	 importation--and	 abuse--of	 capitalist	 norms	of	 private	
property	in	land	(under	the	1858	Ottoman	land	code),	as	notables	(who	had	previously	only	had	
rights	 to	 collect	 taxes)	 now	 appropriated	 large	 estates	 (and	 could	 expel	 peasants);	 this,	
especially	marked	 in	 the	Mashreq,	 intensified	under	 the	British	 and	French	 “mandates”	when	
notables’	 ownership	 of	 land	 was	 further	 conferred	 or	 confirmed	 as	 a	 way	 of	 eliciting	 their	
support.	As	peasants	were	reduced	first	 to	tenants	and	then	to	an	agrarian	proletariat,	a	deep	
sense	of	 injustice	 came	 to	pervade	agrarian	 society,	manifest	 in	waves	of	peasant	 revolt	 from	





the	 British	 rewarded	 collaborating	 tribal	 chiefs	 by	 according	 them	 absolute	 private	 property	
rights	 over	what	had	been	 collective	 tribal	 land,	 a	 violation	of	 the	 traditional	moral	 economy	
that	provoked	eight	rural	uprisings	from	1947	to	1958	against	tribal	shaykhs	(Chalcraft	264-66;	
Gerber	1987:	119-122).	Peasants	land	hunger	was	endemic	and	the	belief	that	the	land	should	
belong	 to	 those	 who	 worked	 it	 (a	 updated	 interpretation	 of	 the	 formerly	 enjoyed	 right	 of	
usufruct)	became	a	slogan	adopted	by	peasant	movements	in	Syria	in	the	1950s	(Hanna	1975).	
In	consequence,	the	post-Ottoman	liberal	oligarchic	orders	in	the	Arab	states,	(such	as	the	king	
or	prime	minister	 led	 landlord-dominated	assembles	 in	Egypt,	Syria	and	 Iraq)	never	achieved	
ideological	hegemony,	making	 them	vulnerable	 to	 radical,	often	rural	based,	movements	 from	
the	1950s;	the	republican	regimes	that	emerged	from	this	milieu	co-opted	peasant	expectations	
in	widely	adopting	land	reforms.		
	 Similarly,	among	the	urban	poor,	 the	expectation	that	government	was	responsible	 for	
ensuring	 provision	 of	 basics	 and	 regulating	 prices,	 above	 all	 that	 of	 bread,	 substantially	 pre-
dates	the	establishment	of	the	populist	social	contract	in	the	1950s.	Thus,	for	example	in	Egypt	
in	 the	 18th	 and	 19th	 centuries,	 urban	 crowds	 attached	 merchant	 granaries	 believed	 to	 be	
profiteering	 while	 the	 Sultan	 of	 Morocco	made	 sure	 he	 had	 grain	 reserves	 for	 times	 of	 food	
shortages--at	 a	 time	 when	 Britain	 used	 market	 rhetoric	 to	 evade	 responsibility	 to	 counter	
famines	in	Ireland	and	India	(Harders	2003;	Beinin	and	Lockman	1987:	91;	Chalcraft	2016:	62,	
146).	 What	 the	 populist	 regimes	 did	 was	 semi-formalize	 the	 contract	 as	 a	 condition	 of	




wage,	 an	 expectation	 of	 the	 indigenous	 moral	 economy	 reinforced	 by	 the	 global	 spread	 of	
socialism	 (Beinin	 and	 Lockman	 1987;	 Chalcraft	 2016:	 154-58,	 182,	 267).	 Nationalism	 and	
populism	 went	 together:	 thus,	 the	 oligarchic	 regimes’	 violations	 of	 the	 indigenous	 moral	
political	 economy	was	 linked	 to	 their	 creation	by	 or	 collaboration	with	 imperialism.	 In	Egypt	
from	 1919	 and	 through	 the	 1920s	 mass	 labour	 strikes	 were	 precipitated	 by	 the	 nationalist	
struggle	against	the	British	but	national	and	class	grievances	merged	in	protests	against	unfair	
dismissals	and	disciplinary	fines	imposed	in	foreign	owned	factories.	In	Iraq	a	1948	mass	urban	
uprising	 combined	 communist-led	 strikes	 by	 port	 and	 railway	 workers	 against	 violations	 of	



























	 Class	 inequalities	were	 everywhere	 under	 attack	 by	 egalitarian	mass	movements	 and	
revolution.	 The	 US	 hegemon	 and	 the	 Soviet	 counter	 hegemon	 converged	 on	 wealth	
redistribution	 as	 the	 capitalist	 West	 adopted	 equalizing	 measures	 to	 blunt	 the	 “subversive”	
appeal	 of	 communism.	 Dominant	 ideologies	 ranging	 from	 communism	 through	 social	
democracy,	 fascism	and	Keysianism	 liberalism	all	 legitimized	 themselves	 by	 claims	 to	 deliver	
social	equality.		
	 In	parallel,	the	spread	of	the	sovereign	states	system	to	the	ex-colonies,	combined	with	
bi-polarity,	 diffused	 power	 to	 the	 global	 peripheries	 (Clark	 2001).	 De-colonization	 and	
alternative	 East	 Bloc	 sources	 of	 technology,	 capital	 and	 markets	 enabled	 more	 autonomous	
state-centric	national	economies	in	the	LDCs.	The	developmental	state—with	a	large	role	for	the	
state	in	the	economy--was	widely	advocated	both	by	development	economists	in	the	West	and	
popular	 movements	 in	 the	 periphery.	 There	 revolutions	 from	 below	 and	 above	 toppled	 old	
oligarchies,	 and	 populist	 ideologies--advocating	 wealth	 redistribution	 via	 a	 ”middle	 way”	







The	 rise	 of	 populist	 authoritarian	 (PA)	 republics	 (1952-67)	 in	 the	 Arab	world	 paralleled	 the	
global	 hegemony	 of	 egalitarian	 norms.	 They	 also	 reflected	 a	 distinct	 stage	 in	 “periphery”	
societies	 when	 the	 landed	 oligarchy	 was	 declining	 but	 an	 industrial	 capitalist	 class	 able	 to	
displace	it	had	not	emerged,	leaving	a	leadership	gap	filled	by	military	officers	and	intellectuals	
of	petit	bourgeois	origin	(Amin	1978).	They	created	“Bonapartist”	regimes,	balancing	populist	













republics.	 It	 was	 the	 military	 that	 took	 the	 lead	 in	 initiating	 these	 ‘revolutions	 from	 above’	




old	 oligarchy	 and	 other	 rivals,	 to	 incorporate	 the	middle	 and	 lower	 classes	 into	 a	 cross-class	
“populist”	coalition.	They	represented	themselves	as	nationalist	regimes	seeking	to	roll	back	the	
remnants	 of	 Western	 imperialism	 in	 the	 region	 and	 defend	 the	 Arab	 cause.	 Their	 economic	
project	 was	 built	 around	 state-led	 investment	 in	 Import	 Substitution	 Industrialization	 (ISI),	
infrastructure	 and	hydraulic	 agriculture,	 aiming	 to	 initiate	 economic	 take-off	 and	 a	 break	 out	
from	the	Arab	World’s	peripheral	position	in	the	global	economy.	A	crucial	 leg	of	their	project	




incorporated	 the	 support	 of	 land	 reform	 peasants	 into	 regimes’	 social	 bases	 (See	 Hania,	 this	
issue).	The	project	initially	produced	growth	combined	with	raised	living	standards	and	falling	
inequality	(in	Nasserist	Egypt	the	Gini	index	fell	1959-75	43	to	38).	Substantial	investments	in	
education	 and	 health	 gave	 momentum	 to	 big	 increases	 in	 life	 expectancy	 and	 human	
development	 indicators.	 There	 was	 considerable	 upward	 mobility	 and	 significant	 poverty	
reduction	compared	to	states	that	did	not	have	populist	revolutions	(Adams	and	Page	2003).		
	 	Regional	 experts	 (Pratt	 2007;	 Beinin	 2001;	 Gerber	 1987;	 Chalcraft	 2016)	 agree	 that	
populist	authoritarian	achieved	a	measure	of	Gramscian	hegemony—widespread	consent.	The	
old	oligarchies	were	so	discredited	that	the	new	regimes	were	widely	welcomed	and	there	was	
a	 consensus	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 national	 modernization	 project.	 Importantly,	 the	 authoritarian	
character	of	these	regimes	did	not	prevent	a	certain	sense	of	 inclusion	among	the	masses	that	
benefited	 from	populist	policies	 that	corresponded	 to	 their	 sense	of	moral	economy.	Workers	
and	 peasants	 were	 included	 through	 corporatist	 organizations:	 Pripstein-Posusney	 (1997),	
dissecting	 the	 relation	 of	 the	 Nasser	 regime	 and	 the	 workers	 unions,	 showed	 that	 workers	
accepted	the	legitimacy	of	the	regime’s	national	project	and	in	return	for	their	contribution	to	it,	
the	 state	 provided	 secure	 employment	 and	 a	 living	wage.	 Similarly,	 in	 Syria	 in	 the	 1950s	 the	
Ba’th	 party	 mobilized	 a	 peasant	 constituency	 through	 its	 struggle	 with	 Syria’s	 great	 feudal	




	 That	 populism	 became	 hegemonic	 is	 indicated	 by	 PA	 regimes’	 ability	 to	 marginalise	
their	competitors	for	mass	loyalties—the	Muslim	Brotherhood	and	the	Marxists--many	of	whom	
were	 co-opted.	 The	 populist	 policies	 of	 the	 Nasser	 regime	 were	 imitated	 by	 the	 subsequent	
wave	 of	 military	 revolutions	 that	 followed	 across	 the	 region.	 So	 incontestable	 did	 citizen	
entitlements	 appear	 at	 this	 time	 that	 the	 conservative	 monarchies,2	even	 though	 they	 found	
Nasserism	 ideologically	 repugnant	 and	 had	 their	 own	 traditional	 legitimacy,	 still	 understood	
that	they	had	to	match	the	republics	in	providing	welfare	for	citizens.	Finally,	the	hegemony	of	










Populism,	 fundamentally	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 inequality-generating	 logic	 of	 finance	 capitalism,	
could	only	thrive	in	a	global	political	economy	when	finance	capital	was	in	retreat.	However,	by	
the	 1980s,	 Keysianism	 had	 been	 superseded	 by	 neo-liberalism.	 This	 originated,	 according	 to	
neo-Gramscian	readings,	 in	an	effort	by	 the	US	hegemon	to	make	up	 for	 its	 loss	of	productive	
ascendancy	 under	 rising	 competition	 from	 Europe	 and	 Asia	 (Arrighi	 and	 Silver	 2001)	 by	
restoring	the	global	supremacy	of	its	finance	capital	over	their	productive	capital	(Gill	2003:	41-
65).	 What	 Harvey	 (2005)	 called	 a	 ‘Wall	 Street-US	 Treasury-IMF	 complex’	 spread	 neo-liberal	
practices	via	transnational	global	networks	of	TNC	chiefs,	bankers,	politicians	and	bureaucrats	
of	the	core	states,	operating	through	international	institutions	like	the	IMF	and	WTO	(Cox	and	
Sinclair	 1996;	 Van	 der	 Pijl	 1998;	 Robinson	 2002).	 The	 move	 to	 neo-liberalism	 was	 in	 part	
enabled	by	the	1970s	oil	price	boom	that	led	to	the	stagflation	of	the	1970s	in	Europe,	preparing	
the	 way	 for	 the	 assault	 on	 the	 Keynesian	 welfare	 state	 by	 Reaganomics/Thatcherism	 and	
making	 the	 neo-liberal	 alternative	 to	 Keysianism	 credible;	 while,	 in	 parallel,	 the	 MENA	 oil	
monarchies’	recycling	of	petrodollars	to	US/UK	banks	and	government	bonds	gave	an	enormous	
boost	to	the	globalization	of	Anglo-American	finance	capital	(Spiro	1999).	Then	came	the	1990s	
collapse	 of	 communism:	 if,	 in	 the	 Cold	War,	 the	 need	 to	 head	 off	 communist	 revolution	 had	
induced	 ruling	 classes	 to	 concede	 higher	 wages	 and	 welfare	 states	 in	 the	 core	 and	 de-
colonization	 in	 the	 periphery,	 now	 they	 looked	 to	 ‘claw	back’	 these	 concessions	 (Clark	 2001;	
Halliday	2002).		
	 As	 markets	 became	 global,	 corporations	 in	 the	 core	 lost	 the	 stake	 they	 had	 under	
Keysian	Fordism	in	national	economies	and	the	prosperity	of	their	workers	and	exited	in	search	
of	 cheap	 labour	 (Gill	 2003:	 93-115;	 Solomon	 2002).	 The	 division	 of	 the	 world	 into	 states	
competing	for	investment	allowed	newly	mobile	finance	capital	to	upset	the	previous	balance	of	
power	among	big	capital,	big	labour	and	government,	producing	a	‘race	to	the	bottom’	in	terms	
of	 social	 standards	 and	 labour	 rights.	 Off-shore	 havens	 facilitated	 massive	 tax	 evasion,	
enervating	 the	 fiscal	 base	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 (Rude	 2004).	 The	 result	 was	 rapid	 growth	 in	
inequality.	 The	 richest	 1%	 of	 the	 global	 population	 appropriated	 income	 equivalent	 to	 the	
poorest	 57%;	 and	 the	 rich	 to	 poor	 income	 gap	 grew	 from	 40:1	 in	 1975	 to	 64:1	 by	 1990	
(Perrons,	2004:	35;	Hartnett	and	Stengrim,	2006:	163).		
	 	In	 the	 periphery,	 neo-liberalism	 was	 spread	 by	 IFI’s	 using	 debt	 leveraged	 structural	
adjustment	 to	 open	 up	 protected	 markets	 and	 force	 privatization	 of	 state	 industries,	 public	
spending	cuts,	tax	breaks	for	investors	and	austerity	for	the	masses.	Under	what	Gill	(2003:159-
80)	 calls	 ‘disciplinary	 constitutionalism,’	 disadvantageous	 trade	 and	 investment	 agreements	
imposed	on	the	LDCs	prioritised	property	and	investor	rights,	dismantled	capital	controls	and	
reorganised	 domestic	 capitalism	 to	 be	 compatible	 with	 the	 requirements	 of	Western	 finance	




Thus,	 periphery	 states	 came	 to	 act	 as	 ‘transmission	 belts’	 (Cox	 and	 Sinclair	 1996)	 for	 the	
enforcement	 of	 capitalist	 discipline	 on	 periphery	 peoples.	 Besides	 such	 structural	 (market,	
ideological)	 power,	 coercion	was	 also	needed	 as	 globalization	 inevitably	 generated	 resistance	
from	its	victims	(Petras	&	Veltmeyer	2005).	Moreover,	after	the	Cold	war,	the	US	hegemon	could	
use	 overt	military	means	 to	 open	 up	 and	 subordinate	markets	 and	 energy	 sources,	 as	 in	 the	
invasion	of	 Iraq.	As	Gowan	 (2004)	put	 it,	militarised	 empire	 is	 the	political	 superstructure	of	
globalization.		
	 Finally,	 global	neo-liberalism	drove	a	 shrinking	of	 effective	political	 inclusion.	Even	as	
procedural	 democracy	 was	 ostensibly	 spread	 globally,	 substantive	 democracy	 (that	 would	
empower	ordinary	people	to	protect	their	socioeconomic	rights)	was	hollowed	out.		In	the	core,	
the	economic	policies	of	most	political	parties	converged	on	the	neo-liberal	consensus,	while	big	
money	 and	 corporate	media	 biased	 elections	 (Cavatorta	 2010;	 Hay	 2007;	 Gill	 2003:	 93-142;	
Lindberg	 2019).	 The	 function	 of	 states	 was	 reconfigured	 away	 from	 the	 provision	 of	 social						
needs	to	the	competition	for	finance	capital	(Cox	and	Sinclair	1996:	191-208).	In	the	periphery	
the	 dominant	 regime	 types	 were	 ranged	 on	 a	 continuum	 between	 “hybrid”	 competitive	
authoritarianism	(e.g.	Egypt	under	Mubarak;	Morocco)	and	what	Robinson	(2002)	called	“low	
	 6	
intensity	 democracy”—a	 purely	 procedural	 pluralism	 in	 which	 the	 big	 issues	 of	 economic	





of	 the	 Middle	 Eastern	 state.	 The	 apparent	 exhaustion	 of	 populism	 provided	 the	 structural	
conditions	for	this.	As	Waterbury	(1991)	argued,	part	of	the	legitimacy	of	the	populist	formula	
was	 that,	 by	 contrast	 to	 both	 pre-Keynesian	 capitalism	 and	 Stalinism,	 it	 did	 not	 engage	 in	 a	
highly	coercive	extraction	of	surplus	from	labour	but	rather	delivered	increases	 in	their	 living	
standards.	 Whether	 this	 was	 “premature	 Keynesianism”	 in	 Waldner’s	 (1999)	 term—
distribution	before	production	had	reached	the	stage	to	enable	mass	welfare	without	retarding	
capital	 accumulation—is	 debatable.	 But	 the	 combination	 of	 high	 investment	 in	 development	
and	 redistributory	 policies	 dictated	 by	 populism,	 military	 expenditures,	 lost	 wars	 and	
corruption	depleted	savings	and	capital	accumulation	in	the	populist	authoritarian	republics.	ISI	
started	out	 by	depending	on	 imports	 of	machinery	 to	produce	manufactured	 goods	 for	 home	
market	consumption	but	the	absence	of	manufacture	exports	plus	falling	prices	of	agricultural	
exports	 created	 balance	 of	 payments	 difficulties.	 Populist	 benefits	 for	 families	 encouraged	
population	explosions	 and	 free	higher	 education	 created	bulges	of	 educated	youth	who	 could	
not	 be	 absorbed	 into	 employment.	 Populism	 was	 economically	 sustainable	 to	 the	 extent	
primary	products	got	good	prices,	as	would	be	so	of	oil	in	the	1970s,	but	in	the	mid-1980s,	the	
collapse	 of	 oil	 prices	 issued	 in	 stagnation	 and	 debt	 in	 many	 MENA	 states,	 making	 them	
vulnerable	to	the	demands	of	the	emerging	neo-liberal	order.	Populism	had	also	been	sustained	
by	 assistance	 from	 the	 core	 economies,	 in	 part	 owing	 to	 Cold	War	 rivalries,	 but	 with	 Soviet	
collapse,	such	resources	also	contracted.		
	 However,	the	agency	behind	the	transformation	of	MENA	states	into	transmission	belts	
of	 neo-liberalism	 was	 provided	 by	 emerging	 new	 ‘post-populist’	 ruling	 coalitions.	 The	
authoritarian	 republics	 over	 time	 generated	 a	 new	 dominant	 class	 alliance	 of	 the	 ‘state	
bourgeoisie,’	 (high	 paid	 military	 officers,	 state	 managers	 and	 bureaucrats),	 with	 a	 revived	
private	bourgeoisie	of	contractors	and	middlemen	doing	business	with	the	state.	As	the	public	
sector	 was	 exhausted	 as	 a	 source	 of	 wealth	 and	 careers,	 the	 state	 bourgeoisie	 looked	 to	
economic	 liberalization	 to	 diversify	 the	 state's	 economic	 base	 as	 well	 as	 to	 provide	
opportunities	 for	 it	 to	 invest	 its	 accumulated	 wealth,	 and	 thereby	 transform	 itself	 into	 a	
property-owning	class.	The	 reviving	private	bourgeoisie	 saw	new	opportunities	 in	neo-liberal	
“infitah“	 (opening)	 for	 foreign	 partners	 and	 to	 acquire	 public	 sector	 assets.	 The	 new	 post-
populist	ruling	coalitions	were	increasingly	receptive	to	globalization	(Dodge	and	Higgott	2002,	
13-35;	Waterbury	1991;	Ehteshami	and	Murphy	1993).		
Typically,	 partial	 liberalization,	 beginning	 in	 the	 seventies	 and	 eighties,	 first	 opened	
MENA	 countries	 to	 import	 booms	 facilitating	 enrichment	 of	 politically-connected	 merchants	
granted	 import	monopolies	but	also	often	bankrupting	 local	 industries	and	 leading	 to	deficits	
and	debt.	Debt	gave	the	IMF	leverage	to	push	its	neo-liberal	agenda,	particularly	the	rollback	of	
the	state’s	 role	 in	 the	economy	and	 in	delivering	welfare—all	done	 in	 the	name	of	 “structural	
adjustment.”	 Government	 expenditure	 of	MENA	 states	 fell	 precipitously	 from	more	 than	 fifty	
percent	of	GDP	in	the	1970s	to	twenty-two	percent	in	the	early	1990s	and	with	it	state	capacity	
(Cammett	and	Diwan	2013:	ESCSA	1918:	11-12).	Later,	IFI’s	privatization	demands	were	used	
by	 regime	 elites	 and	 crony	 or	 foreign	 capitalists	 to	 acquire	 public	 sector	 assets	 on	 the	 cheap	
(King	2009;	Heydemann	2004;	Guazzone	and	Pioppi	2009;	Cammett	and	Diwan	2013).	Reviving	
capitalism	meant	 investors	 had	 to	 be	 favoured	 through	 reduction	 of	 labour	 rights	 and	wages	
while	IMF	demands	for	structural	adjustment	and	debt	repayment	legitimized	austerity	for	the	
masses	 (while	 leaving	 intact	 military	 purchases	 from	 Western	 arms	 dealers).	 In	 essence,	
regimes	started	to	renege	on	the	populist	social	contract.3	
This	was	legitimized	at	the	elite	level	by	neo-liberal	globalization	discourse.	Thus,	just	as	






oligarchy	 and	 populist	 redistribution	 in	MENA,	 so	 now	 the	 norm	promoted	 by	 global	 finance	
capital	 that	 scarce	 capital	 and	managerial	 talent	 deservedly	 commanded	 exceptional	 rewards	




available	 in	 the	 1970s	 transformed	 the	 normative	 context	 from	 “thawra”	 (revolution)—to	





provided	 good	 pickings	 for	 “networks	 of	 privilege”	 (Heydemann	 2004)--speculative	 foreign	
capital	 and	 ruling	 elites	 and	 businessmen	 with	 insider	 connections	 (Abdul	 Khalek	 2001)--to	
turn	public	into	private	monopolies.	In	parallel,	the	military	acquired	a	stake	in	crony	capitalism	
by	 spreading	 its	 tentacles	 into	 the	 civilian	 economy	 in	 several	 states	 (Marshall	 and	 Stacher	
2013;	 Said	 2018).	 In	 Algeria	 IMF	 demands	 led	 to	 a	 big	 sell	 off	 of	 1000	 public	 enterprises	 in	
1996-97	allowing	elites	to	use	corruptly	gained	funds	to	buy	public	assets	and	build	clientalist	
networks	 (King	2009:	 145-69).	 In	Egypt	 500	 firms	 came	 to	 be	 controlled	by	32	businessmen	
(most	of	whom	held	political	posts	in	the	mid-2000s)	that	got	60%	of	corporate	profits	but	only	
employed	 11%	 of	 the	 formal	 private	 labour	 force.	 In	 Tunisia,	 the	 firms	 appropriated	 by	
President	Ben	Ali’s	entourage	made	over	21%	of	private	sector	profits	but	produced	only	3%	of	
output	and	employed	1%	of	the	labour	force.		
Crony	 capitalism	 provided	 little	 new	 skilled	 employment	 because	 investment	
concentrated	in	fields	where	capital	remained	mobile--tourism,	commerce	and	services,	rather	
than	industry	(which	declined	as	a	proportion	of	GNP	and	investment);	politically-unconnected	
investors	 were	 deterred	 and	 small	 firms	 lacked	 access	 to	 capital.	 The	 result	 was	 the	
tertiarization	 of	 the	MENA	 economy	 and	 an	 absence	 of	more	 productive	medium	 sized	 firms	
(ESCWA	1918L	19).	The	new	private	sector	did	not	invest	enough	to	make	up	for	the	decline	in	




capitalism,	drove	 it	 in	MENA.4	In	 the	crony	capitalist	 sector	good	 jobs	went	 to	well-connected	
clients,	feeding	a	public	equation	of	economic	liberalism	with	corruption	and	inequality	(ESCWA	
2018:	 18).	 The	 rollback	 in	 labour	 rights,	 ending	 job	 security	 without	 according	 the	 right	 to	
strike,	and	the	reversal	of	land	reforms,	drove	down	the	share	of	labour	in	GDP	to	the	advantage	
of	 capital.	Declines	 in	public	employment	opportunities,	 subsidy	cuts	and	wage	squeezes	hurt	
workers	 and	 the	poor.	As	 such,	 in	 1991-95,	 in	Egypt	 the	 share	 of	GDP	of	 the	poorest	 20%	of	
population	 fell	 from	3.9	to	1.7%	while	 the	richest	20%	share	 increased	 from	20	to	26%.	Over	
the	period	1996	to	2005	there	was	a	further	17%	increase	in	inequality	(Azzawi	2010).	Poverty	























	 The	 rural	 areas	 especially	 suffered	 from	neo-liberalism.	 	With	 the	 reversal	of	Nasser’s	
tenancy	 laws	 in	 the	 1990s,	more	 than	 a	million	 peasants	 lost	 secure	 land	 tenure,	 their	main	
livelihood	 and	 pride.	 Girls	 were	 taken	 out	 of	 school	 as	 their	 families	 lost	 access	 to	 land.	 For	
peasants	 the	 world	 was	 turned	 upside	 down,	 feudalism	 had	 returned	 and	 the	 government	
blamed	 for	 depriving	 people	 of	 their	 livelihood	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 natural	 rights	 extended	 to	
them	in	the	populist	period	(Saad	2003;	Bush	2003).	In	Algeria,	Benjedid	returned	nationalized	
land	 to	 former	 owners	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 peasants	 while	 in	 Tunisia	 an	 agrarian	 counter-
revolution	dismantled	peasant	cooperatives	and	transferred	600,000	hectares	to	a	rural	elite	at	
below	market	rates	with	support	from	a	World	Bank	loan	(King	2009).	




this	 special	 issue	 on	 the	 most	 recent	 subsidy	 cuts	 in	 MENA	 countries).	 In	 global	 neo-liberal	
discourse	food	subsidies	were	“wasteful”	but	removing	them	ran	up	against	the	“strong	sense	of	
entitlement”	 among	 the	 people	 (Salevurakis	 and	 Abdul	 Halim	 2008).	 Food	 riots	 followed	
elsewhere	 across	 the	 region	 in	 response	 to	 similar	 IMF	 pressures	 for	 structural	 adjustment,	
often	forcing	governments	to	retreat	(Seddon	1989;	Sadiki	1997)	and	to	resort	to	austerity	by	
stealth	(e.g.	through	salamy	tactics).	In	parallel,	as	worker	protections	were	removed	in	tandem	
with	 privatizations	 of	 public	 industry,	workers’	 strikes	 escalated,	 notably	 in	 Egypt	 under	 the	
2004	Nazif	 	 “government	of	businessmen”	 (Beinin	2008).	 	Nationalist	 issues	 intertwined	with	
resistance	 to	 populist	 rollback:	 thus,	 the	 2003	 anti-Iraq	 war	 movement	 in	 Egypt	 intersected	
with	 waves	 of	 workers	 strikes	 against	 privatization	 and	 discontent	 over	 cuts	 in	 subsidized	
bread	 to	 spawn	 the	 6	 April	 and	 the	 Kifaya	 movements	 that	 prepared	 the	 way	 for	 the	 2011	
Uprising.	In	Tunisia	an	export-oriented	development	strategy	required	driving	down	wages	and	




	 Such	rollbacks	of	 the	populist	 social	contract,	especially	when	combined	with	 the	 “off-
loading”	of	state	welfare	responsibilities	to	Islamist	charities,	also,	inadvertently,	made	regimes	
vulnerable	to	the	rise	of	Islamic	opposition	movements	that	attracted	those	strata	frozen	out	of	
regime	 networks	 or	 dependent	 on	 Islamist	 charities	 (Heyderian:	 95-127).	 The	 struggle	 over	
post-populist	transition	took	the	most	extreme	form	in	Algeria	where	it	unleashed	civil	war.	In	
Algeria’s	 October	 1988	 riots,	 a	 function	 of	 austerity	 measures	 accompanying	 oil	 price	 falls,	
protestors	 targeted	 elite	 districts,	 demanding	 what	 they	 considered	 their	 “rights”	 and	
denouncing	 egregious	 liberalizer,	 President	 Benjedid.	 When	 army	 killings	 further	 spread	




	 A	 new	 social	 contract	 based	 on	 political	 democratization	might	 have	 been	 devised	 to	
substitute	 for	 the	 populist	 one	 and,	 indeed,	 in	 a	 number	 of	 Arab	 countries	 citizens	 were	
promised	greater	political	 rights	 in	return	 for	giving	up	economic	entitlements	(Meijer	2017).	
However,	 the	 result	 was	 tightly	 controlled--political	 liberalization,	 not	 full	 democratization--	
and	 reversible.	 Full	 democratization	 was	 deterred	 by	 several	 factors.	 “Post-populist”	 ruling	
coalitions	included	crony	capitalists	that	would	be	threatened	by	democratic	transparency	and	




with	new	patronage	 resources	 to	 foster	 supportive	 crony	 capitalists	 (King	2008;	Amirah,	 this	
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issue).	Political	 liberalization	was	 lopsided--designed	 to	 relatively	empower	 those	who	would	
benefit	from	and	support	neo-liberalism	and	to	demobilize	its	victims.	Thus,	opposition	parties	
were	allowed	to	compete	for	parliamentary	seats,	but	denied	the	right	to	politically	organize	the	
masses.	 The	 interest	 groups	 of	 the	 bourgeoisie	 were	 given	 greater	 corporatist	 and	




For	 liberals,	 the	 Arab	Uprisings	marked	 the	 embrace	 of	 liberalism	 and	 democracy	 in	 the	 last	
region	 seemingly	 resistant	 to	 them.	 By	 contrast,	 radical	 political	 economists	 attributed	 the	
Uprisings	 to	 the	spread	of	neo-liberalism.	For	scholars	such	as	Aschar	 (2013),	Hanieh	(2013),	
Heyderian	 (2014:1-5)	 and	 Cammett	 and	 Diwan	 (2013),	 the	 abandonment	 of	 the	 “Arab	
developmental	model,”	 the	 opening	 of	 economies	 to	 the	 shocks	 of	 financial	 globalization,	 the	
plunder	of	public	assets	under	crony	capitalism,	and	the	narrowing	of	 the	authoritarian	social	
coalition	 were	 to	 blame.	 For	 Bush	 and	 Ayeb	 (2012:	 4,	 6),	 the	 uprisings	 capped	 a	 decade	 of	
resistance	 to	 neo-liberalization	 in	 which	 “Egypt	 developed	 but	 Egyptians	 did	 not”	 (see	 also	
Solava	 Ibrahim,	 this	 issue).	 Since	 the	 regimes	 overthrown	were	 both	 authoritarian	 and	 post-
populist,	how	can	we	tell	whether	the	former	or	the	 latter	mattered	most?	Were	the	uprisings	
chiefly	a	backlash	against	neo-liberal	globalization	or	its	triumph?	What	further	complicates	the	
issue	 is	 that	 the	 uprisings	 were	 mounted	 by	 cross-class	 coalitions	 in	 which	 different	
components	had	somewhat	different	grievances;	the	Westernized	upper	middle	class	youth	that	
spearheaded	 the	mobilization	 did	 seem	 to	 be	motivated	 by	 democracy	 demands;	 but	 for	 the	
lower	middle	class	declining	job	opportunities	and	for	the	poor,	the	rising	price	of	subsistence	
goods	 mattered;	 it	 is	 entirely	 likely	 that	 both	 explanations	 are	 right	 but	 for	 different	
participants	in	the	uprisings	and	that	many	protest	participants	had	mixed	motives.	Moreover,	
most	 protestors	 would	 have	 understood	 that	 political	 changes	 were	 needed	 to	 restore	 what	
they	saw	as	lost	socio-economic	rights.	Still,	three	kinds	of	evidence	support	the	hypothesis	that	




the	 findings	 of	 numerous	 polls,5	reveal	 that	 the	 main	 demand	 of	 the	 protestors	 was	 not	 for	
procedural	 liberal	democracy	(competitive	elections,	political	rights)	alone	but	 for	substantive	
democracy--socio-economic	 rights	 (i.e.	 the	 social	 democracy	 that	 was	 simultaneously	 being	
hollowed	out	in	much	of	the	core).	The	main	grievances	were	lack	of	economic	opportunity	and,	
indicative	 of	 the	 perceived	 illegitimacy	 of	 crony	 capitalism,	 the	 high	 perceived	 levels	 of	
corruption:	as	causes	of	the	uprising,	respondents	mentioned	economic	problems	first	(56%	in	
Egypt	 and	 48%	 in	 Tunisia)	 and	 corruption	 second	 while	 political	 rights	 and/or	 an	 end	 to	
authoritarian	rule	were	nominated	by	under	a	quarter	in	Egypt,	Jordan	and	Tunisia.	To	be	sure,	
the	 middle	 class	 put	 higher	 value	 on	 democratization	 and	 the	 working	 classes	 on	 socio-
economic	 grievances.	 All	 seemed	 to	 value	 political	 accountability	 (however	 that	 might	 be	
delivered)	 in	 the	 pervasive	 backlash	 against	 the	 abuses	 of	 the	 security	 forces	 expressed	 in	
protestors’	 demands	 for	 dignity.	 Yet	 enthusiasm	 for	 procedural	 democracy	 was	 generally	
tempered:	e.g.	about	40%	in	Egypt	and	Tunisia	thought	citizens	were	not	ready	for	it,	and	while	
roughly	 half	 thought	 democracy	 was	 superior,	 another	 half	 wanted	 some	 form	 of	 Islamist	
regime	 or	 a	 secular	 authoritarian	 regime.	 Many	 came	 to	 prioritize	 order	 (indicated	 by	 the	
remarkably	 high	 (over	 60%)	 support	 for	 the	 police.	 Disorder	 plus	 intensified	 repression,	
disillusioned	many:	 support	 for	democracy	declined	 from	2011	 to	2014	 (from	55-60	 to	45%)	








respondents	 thought	 the	 uprising	 had	 been	 positive	 for	 their	 country	 (12%	of	 Egyptians	 and	
31%	 of	 Tunisians)	 and	 most	 thought	 the	 economic	 situation	 had	 deteriorated	 significantly	
compared	 to	 2009	 (See	 also	 Solava	 Ibrahim,	 this	 issue).	 Tunisia,	 the	 country	 with	 the	 most	




“fall	of	 the	 regime”	were	 indicative	of	how	 far	alienation	had	gone	beyond	a	mere	demand	 to	
restore	food	subsidies	that	had	been	typical	of	the	food	riots	of	the	past	decades.	Now,	as	their	
slogans,	 “Bread,	 Freedom,	 Social	 Justice”	 indicated,	 political	 and	 socio-economic	 change	were	
seen	as	intimately	interconnected.	But	this	is	quite	compatible	with	the	strong	tendency	by	Arab	
publics	 to	 accord	 government	 legitimacy	 according	 to	 outcomes	 (as	 exemplified	 in	 the	
expectations	 of	 the	 populist	 contract),	 rather	 than	 being	 satisfied	 solely	 with	 procedural	
democracy	 (Armbrust	 2011;	 Cammett	 and	 Diwan	 2013).	 Indeed,	 for	 them,	 the	 neo-liberal	
attempt	to	insulate	the	economic	sphere	from	politics	(excluding	issues	such	as	the	distribution	
















	 	On	 the	other	hand,	a	 food	crisis	did	afflict	 the	region	 in	 the	years	before	 the	uprising,	
rooted	 in	 regional	 vulnerability	 to	 the	 neo-liberal	 world	 market.	 Egypt	 is	 the	 iconic	 case:	 in	
1960,	 Egypt	 was	 producing	 enough	 wheat	 to	 be	 almost	 self-sufficient	 but	 by	 2010	 it	 was	
importing	roughly	half	 its	 total	wheat,	making	 it	 the	biggest	wheat	 importer	 in	 the	world.	For	
awhile,	 food	 riots	 there	 (as	well	 as	 in	 Tunisia	 and	Morocco)	 had	 deterred	 regimes	 from	 fully	
succumbing	to	IMF	pressures	to	eliminate	food	subsidies,	with	their	retention,	ironically,	made	
possible	because	of	cheap	surplus	grains	made	available	by	 the	US	 to	 its	clients	 in	 the	Middle	
East.	The	United	States	provided	Egypt	with	$4.6	billion	 in	 loans	and	grants	 for	 food	between	
1979	and	1997.	However,	this	and	IFI	pressures	to	reduce	state	aid	to	agriculture--even	as	the	
West	 continued	 it	 to	 its	 own	 agriculture,	 thereby	 producing	 surpluses	 exported	 to	 MENA--
hollowed	out	 regional	 agriculture	 and	made	 states	 over-dependent	 on	 food	 imports	 from	 the	
West,	particularly	as	export	crops	replaced	 food	crops	sold	on	 the	 local	market.	Of	 the	 top	20	




neo-liberalism.	 The	 2008	 collapse	 of	 banks	 and	 financial	 markets	 in	 the	 West,	 rooted	 in	
speculative	casino	capitalism,	plus	the	creation	of	commodity	index	funds,	funnelled	speculative	
investors	 into	supposedly	safe	food	markets,	helping	to	push	up	world	food	prices	 in	2008-11	
(Hayderian	 2014:	 76-94;	 Harrigan	 2014).	 By	 early	 2011,	 food	 prices	 had	 reached	 what	 the	
World	Bank	called	“dangerous	levels,”	pushing	44	million	people	into	extreme	poverty	(Ciezadlo	
2011).	 As	Kaufman	 (2010:	 34)	 put	 it,	 “Bankers	 had	 taken	 control	 of	 the	world’s	 food,	money	
chased	money	and	a	billion	people	went	hungry.”	
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	 Global	 food	 price	 shocks	 translated	 rapidly	 into	 MENA	 price	 hikes	 with	 inflation	
increasing	 at	 twice	 the	 global	 speed.	 In	 Egypt,	 bread	 prices	 rose	 by	 37	 percent	 between	
February	2007	and	February	2008	and	long	bread	lines	stimulated	protests,	with	those	among	
factory	 workers	 generating	 the	 April	 6	 Movement	 that	 would	 later	 play	 a	 role	 in	 Egypt’s	
Uprising;	 an	 alarmed	 President	 Mubarak	 ordered	 the	 army	 to	 take	 over	 the	 baking	 and	
distribution	of	subsidized	bread	to	the	public	(Ciezadlo	2011).	In	2008,	bread	protests	spread	to	
Jordan,	 Morocco,	 Algeria,	 Lebanon	 and	 Yemen.	 Thus,	 the	 manipulation	 of	 international	 food	
prices	by	global	finance	capital	artificially	created	a	food	crisis	in	MENA	that	set	the	stage	for	the	
uprising:	 spikes	 in	 bread	prices	made	 regimes’	 reneging	 on	 the	 populist	 social	 contact	 highly	







If	 reneging	on	 the	populist	 social	 contract	was	 the	main	driver	of	 the	Uprisings,	authoritarian	
regimes	 that	 sustained	 it	 should	 have	 experienced	 much	 less	 severe	 rebellion	 while	 if	
democratic	 aspirations	 were	 the	 driver	 all	 authoritarian	 regimes	 would	 likely	 have	 faced	
comparable	uprisings.		
	 In	 fact,	 the	 Uprisings	 were	 experienced	 unevenly	 across	 the	 Arab	 world:	 while	 the	
republics	were	widely	destabilized	 the	monarchies,	Bahrain	aside,	 seemed	relatively	 immune.	
The	difference	arguably	comes	down	to	two	factors,	variation	in	ability	to	sustain	the	populist	
social	 contract	 and	 differences	 in	 the	 mix	 of	 legitimacy	 (ruling	 bargains)	 on	 which	 these	
different	regimes	were	founded.	Both	factors	support	assessments	that	the	Arab	Uprising	was	a	
direct	consequence	of	regimes’	reneging	on	the	populist	contract.	
	 First,	 the	monarchies’	 greater	 oil	 resources	 and	 smaller	 populations	 (and	 reliance	 on	
non-citizen	labour	unentitled	to	any	social	rights)	enabled	them	to	sustain	the	contract	for	their	
citizens.	 Indeed,	Saudi	Arabia	 famously	distributed	massive	handouts	 to	 them,	and	made	rent	
available	to	non-oil	Jordan	and	Morocco	to	similarly	appease	their	populations	(Shehadeh	2011;	
Heyderian	128-50).	But,	additionally,	the	monarchies’	legitimacy	was	not	wholly	dependent	on	












via	 land	 reform	 and	 party	 organization.	 Under	 Hafiz	 al-Asad,	 peasant	 producers	 enjoyed	
subsidized	 inputs	 and	 got	 good	 state	 prices	 for	 crops.	 As	 a	 result,	 Syria	 enjoyed	 rising	 rural	
incomes,	 and	 increased	agricultural	 surpluses.	 It	became	self-sufficient	 in	grains,	 enabling	 the	
provision	 of	 cheap	 bread	 for	 urban	 consumers	 without	 reliance	 on	 the	 international	 grain	
market.	 After	 2000,	 however,	 under	 Bashar	 al-Asad’s	 neo-liberal	 reforms,	 subsidies	 were	
whittled	 away,	 e.g.	 on	 diesel	 fuel	 used	 for	 pump	 irrigation,	 at	 the	 very	 time	 when	 the	
unprecedented	 and	 punishing	 drought	 of	 2006-11	 hit	 many	 of	 the	 grain	 growing	 eastern	
provinces	 of	 the	 country,	 causing	whole	 villages	 to	 be	 deserted	 and	mass	migration	 to	 urban	
slums.	 	 This	 enervated	 the	 Ba’th’s	 rural	 populist	 base	 and,	 indeed,	 a	main	 component	 of	 the	
opposition	 to	 the	 regime	 during	 the	 uprising	 came	 from	 the	 rural	 underclass,	 often	 such	
migrants	who,	 feeling	victimized	and	neglected	by	 the	regime,	 turned	 into	 the	 foot	soldiers	of	
Islamist	 rebellion.	 The	 Syrian	 regime	 had,	 unlike	 the	 other	 republics,	 kept	 its	 nationalist	
credentials	but	without	 the	populist	element,	 it	was	not	enough	(Hinnebusch	and	Zintl	2014).	
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Symptomatic	of	 the	 centrality	of	 the	populist	 contract	was	 that,	 even	amidst	 the	uprising,	 the	
regime	continued	the	delivery	of	subsidized	bread	 in	areas	where	 it	still	governed	 in	order	 to	
demonstrate	 that	 the	Ba’thist	 state	was	still	meeting	 its	historic	 responsibilities;	and	 the	rival	
“Islamic	State”	also	made	a	big	show	of	taking	over	flour	mills	and	delivering	subsidized	bread	
(see	Mara	and	Ariel,	this	issue).		
	 In	 summary,	 the	 states	 whose	 legitimacy	 was	 dependent	 on	 the	 social	 contract—
acknowledging	popular	sovereignty	in	principle	and	reneged	on	it	in	practice--namely,	the	post	
populist	republics,	were	most	vulnerable	to	the	uprising	while	those	whose	legitimacy	was	not	




Both	 rulers	 and	 ruled	 in	 the	 Arab	 World’s	 republics	 were	 aware	 that	 the	 populist	 social	
contract,	 epitomized	 by	 the	 guarantee	 of	 affordable	 bread	 to	 the	 population,	was	 part	 of	 the	
“ruling	 bargain.”	 It	 was	 embedded	 in	 the	 region’s	 traditional	 moral	 economy	 and	 the	
congruence	of	the	latter	with	the	dominant	egalitarian	norms	at	the	global	level	during	the	era	
of	retreat	by	finance	capital	(1930-80)	enhanced	the	hegemony	of	populist-nationalist	discourse	
in	 the	 Arab	 world	 and	 enabled	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 the	 populist	 social	 contract	 in	 the	
authoritarian	 republics.	 However,	 the	 rise	 of	 neoliberalism	 and	 the	 restored	 dominance	 of	
globalized	 finance	capital	was	 incongruent	with	populism	at	 the	regional	 level.	This	 led	to	 the	
reconstitution	 of	 populist	 ruling	 coalitions	 incorporating	 the	 masses	 into	 post-populist	 ones	
excluding	 them	and	privileging	crony	capitalists.	Reneging	on	 the	populist	 social	 contract	and	
unwilling	to	replace	it	with	a	new	contract,	regimes	resorted	to	“authoritarian	upgrading.”	The	
Arab	uprising	was	more	a	reaction	against	globalization	 than	a	 triumph	of	 it	 since	protestors’	
demands	were	 less	 for	 the	 purely	 procedural	 low	 intensity	 democracy	 promoted	 under	 neo-
liberalism	 than	 for	 a	more	 inclusive	 and	 just	 political	 order	 that	 would	 revalidate	 the	moral	
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